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Doctors, Death and Dying
George Kanoti, S.T.D .

Dr. Kanoti is associate professor of religious studies at John
Carroll University. His special
areas of interest are contemporary moral trends and medical
ethics, including the moral implications of genetic manipulation.
A widely published author, his
articles have appeared in the
Journal of Religion and Health
and in Linacre Quarterly. Dr.
Kanoti is a co-author of a report
on medical and professional ethical codes for Catholic hospitals,
which was sponsored jointly by
the Catholic Th eological Society
of America and by the staff of
the Kennedy Center for Bioethics.

Both the classic and contemporary expressions of the physician's
vocation, role, and responsibility
indicate a consistent dedication to
the service of man.
I will follow that system of regimen
which. acco rdin g to my ability and
judgment, I co nsider for the benefit
of m y patients, and abstain from
whatever is deleterious a nd mischievous. 1
The health a nd life of m y patient
will be my first consideration .2

In a ll professional relationships between a physician and his patient,
the physician 's primary con cern
must be the health of his patienP
The principal object of the medical
professio n is to render service to
humanity with full respect for the
dignity of man ..J

Therapies and regimens have
been shaped by what is understood as serving the goal of service to the health and life of the
patient. Or, more precisely, therapies and regimens reflect what
physicians judge best serves the
goal of service to the health and
life of the patient. Various factors contribute to the standards
of judgment a physician employs to decide what is the best
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means to serve the health and life
of his patient. Among these are :
the social and bio-medical concepts of disease, religious dogmas,
political considerations, economic
considerations, etc.; but, most importantly, the concept of the
value of human life itself. This
concept has, perhaps, the most
direct influence on the type of
therapy and routine chosen by
the physician for his patients.
Currently we are witnessing a
profound shift in the concept of
the value of human life which directs the type of therapy a physician will initiate for his patient
and the advice he will give to his
patient. The concept of the value
of human life which held ascendency in physicians' minds for
man y years is being abandoned.
Its replacement is gaining support, perhaps because of the vacuum created by the abandonment
of the former position. The traditional position places the patient's life as the highest and
directing value in judgments of
therapy. Conversely, the ultimate
negative is death. The antithesis
of life is death. Death is seen as
the ultimate enemy. Accordingly,
death is to be resisted or combatted by any and all effective
means.
This concept of the importance
of human life and the ultimate
enemy of life, death , directed the
education of many physicians,
who were trained to fight illness
and death and were not emotionally prepared to accept the
death of their patients. ' This
militant concept of service to life
November, 1975

and health produced many un fortun ate therapeutic judgments
which, for example, at times kept
comatose patients "alive" for
days, even months. Severe and
trenchant criticism has been
leveled against this militant interpretation of a physician's responsibility to serve the life and
health of his patients. 6 These
criticisms, made primarily on the
basis of the violations of human
dignity of the patient induced by
such therapies, have contributed
substantially to the abandonment
of the concept of human life as
the highest and directing value in
judgments of therapy and are influencing directly the types of
therapy chosen by physicians.
However, another unders tanding of the value of human life is
being forwarded as a replacement
for the militant concept. The concept has va rio u s descriptive
names such as, death by choice,'
death with dignity, ~ a right to
die,') etc. These des c rip t i v e
phrases imply that service to the
health and life of man includes
among the physician's armatorium, assisted dignified death,
assisted painless or easy death ,
classically called euthanasia. iii
Recent Term-Ancient Concept
Although the term euthanasia
is relatively recent, the concept
and practice are ancient. So, although the concept is not new,
what is remarkable is the range
of subjects deemed suitable for
euthanasia, as well as the growing unnuanced acceptance of euthanasia as, at the very least, the
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partial determiner of the physician's responsibilities to his patient. As one reviews the medicalethical literature one discovers
discussion and debate on neonate
euthanasia, I I and severe traumatic euthanasia. 12 (It is interesting to note that geriatric euthanasia has not been seriously
discussed despite the fact that
the principles employed in neonate and terminal euthanasia
could logically apply to geriatrics.) Defective infants and terminally ill patients of all ages are
considered apt for euthanasia under certain conditions. Furthermore, a more subtle and at times
explicit assertion found in the literature on euthanasia is that a
physician ought to consider death
as his ally and not his enemy in
certain cases. I.l
The pressures, expectations and
crises of daily medical practice do
not permit a physician the luxury
of reflection, much less a critique
of his personal and professional
goals and ideals. His medical
judgment, etiquette and interpersonal contacts proceed efficiently and humanely by permitting his personal and professional
goals and ideals to direct his perceptions and judgments. When
major assumptions such as the
value of human life and the me~.ns
to serve such value are challenged,
a physician's confidence in his
practice and judgment can be
shaken. Furthermore, when the
focal point of his professional
dedication becomes diffused, his
sense of personal well-being and
purpose also can become con-
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fused. Human life, its value and
service to the same, form the very
essence of a physician's self image
and directly define the responsibilities he has · as a healer of
men. Consequently, challenges to
these essential concepts create
concern for the physician. Also,
these challenges have begun to
create some difficulty in the conditions of trust necessary for an
effective physician-patient relationship. In the past, a patient
could make a well-founded assumption that his physician was
pro-life and would take all reasonable caution and effort to protect and prolong his life. However, with the legalization of abortion, the proliferation of abortion
procedures, and the growing discussion of euthanasia, a patient
may be reluctant to make that
assumption.
All of the s e considerations
make it imperative for a physician to re-evaluate his stance on
the value of human life, the concept of death, and his special responsibility as a physician to
serve the life and health of his
patients. The process of reevaluation must begin with a
physician's own experiences, incorporate his professional colleagues' experiences, then expand
to medical guidelines, and, finally, absorb what the professional
evaluators, the ethicians, be they
philosophers or ethical theologians, present on the issue.
There is an inherent difficulty
in pursuing this regimen of ethical wisdom. When a physician
does a thorough review and reLinacre Quarterly

evaluation of his position on human life's value by touching a ll
t he bases mentioned above, he
will quickly discover no clear consensus on t he question of value
a nd terminat ion of life. A glance
at his own and his colleagues' ex periences makes t he cont radictions evident.
Despite much criticism abou t
t he physicians' lack of a moral ethical perspective, most physicians are morally a nd ethically
concerned about their patients.
They do wish to serve the life a nd
health of t heir patients; t hey do
not wish to h a rm , but rather to
comfort, a lleviate, and , hopefully,
cure. However, physicians also
sense t hat in some illnesses, death
is t h eir friend as well as the patien t's fri end. It is when this
awa reness grows into conscious
choice t hat t he serious ethical
a mbivalence and even con tradictio ns are found. If death is t he
fri end, the patient must be served
by allowin g death its place. But
how? Which therapy must not be
initiated, which must be discontinued? What advice ought to be
given to the patient, the fa mil y,
t he nursing staff? 14 These particularl y crucial questions require
t he physician , the patient, and
t he family to reveal how they
view the significance of hu man
life and t heir responsibilities for
life. H ere the ambivalence and
contradictory po s it i on s revea l
themselves. Some say t hat the
quality of life is more important
than mere physical existence.
Some feel no person can morally
termi nate the life of another perNovember, 1975

son. Others feel either a personal,
social, or even governmental judgment about t he con tin uation of
life is the only morall y relevant
consideration.
When t he physicia n looks to
t he standards of his profession for
guidance in this re-evaluation , he
discovers an expression of the
traditional position on human
life, albeit with greater nuance
a nd subt lety.
The in tentiona l termination of the
life of one huma n be ing by a nother
-mercy killing-is co n trary to t hat
for which t he medica l profession
sta nds and is contra ry to t he po licy
of the American M edi ca l Association.
The cessation of t he emp loyment of
extrao rdinary m ea ns to p rolong the
life of the body wh e n there is irrefuta bl e evide nce t hat biologi cal
d eath is immine nt is t he d ec is ion of
t he patient and l or his imm ediate
fa mil y. The advice a nd judgm e n t
of t he physic ia n s hould be free ly
ava ilable to th e patient andl or hi·s
immediate fa mily. 1.;

The distinctions between extraordinary and ordinary means, direct and indirect euthanasia, active and passive euthanasia, he
also discovers, are being challenged by various ethicists. 1(,
Concepts of Human Life
Out of this confusion of opinion, prejudice and uncertainty
several lines are being brought
into sharp focus concerning huma n life, its value, a nd the question of termination of life. First
of all, the militant concept of human life and the physician's responsibility to human life which
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lead to some questionable therapy
is definitely to be abandoned as
an appropriate ethical position
undergirding medical advice and
therapy. Or in other words, individual human life is not of itself an absolute value. There is an
appropriate time for man to die
and the physician has a responsibility to assist this death, just
as he has a responsibility to serve
the continuance of life.
Secondly, since man has direct
responsibility for life and its termination, the question of how to
fulfill this responsibility must be
met. There are several important
ethical considerations which will
assist the physician in making
this judgment. Some general comments are in place before specific
guidelines are suggested. Respect
for human life must be upheld .
Any policies which tend to create
a casualness toward human life
are to be avoided. A principal
safeguard against a casual attitude toward human life is found
in humanistic and religious belief
that man's value does not come
from other men but from a source
other than man himself; in Christian belief this is God the Creator. A constant reassertion of
this belief will help prevent the
hubris of power to overtake the
judgment of who shall live and
who shall die.
More specifically, apart from
the medical judgments concerning the depth of the illness and
the prognostic judgment, several
questions must be answered before therapeutic choice is made.
Primarily, the attitude of the pa-
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tient toward his life and death
must be ascertained either by personal con t act or through his
closest relative. The old family
doctor concept provided ready
important information a Ion g
these lines. In the age of specialists and referrals, the information
may not be as readily available.
If the patient desires to hold onto
life at all costs, this must be
known. Or, if the patient is content with his life and not afraid
of death, this must be known.
Furthermore, the question of his
personal, familial and/ or social
needs and obligations must be
answered. The greater and more
extensive the obligation, the more
life should be supported.
Finally, concerning the direct
intervention in the termination of
life, this author judges that not
enough evidence has been presented to indicate that such intervention is an ethically viable
position. It is tempting to agree
with the direct intervention position, especially in light of all the
pain and anxiety and loss of dignity which resulted from some of
the therapies which based themselves on the militant position.
However, certain value positions
seem to balance the ethical scales
to a mid-ground away from both
the militant extreme and the euthanasia position. Some of these
positions are the value of suffering as both an example and as a
reminder that evil has not been
conquered in this existence, and
as an opportunity for giving of
self to the needs of another. Another value which makes one
Linacre Quarterly

pause is the realization that individual worth is not based solely
on ability, power and status, but
on intrinsic worth given to him,
in the religious interpretation, by
his God. One of the most precious
of these values is life. Attempts
to intervene directly in life leave
the door open to less than honorable motivations.
How then ought a physician reevaluate his position on the value
of human life and the question of
termination of life? He ought to
remember that he is dedicated to
serve life, not be a slave of life.
The life he serves is a specific life
of an individual person who has
microcosmic interrelationships of
obligations, needs, and expectations which must be recognized
and respected. Each judgment a
physician reaches must respect
life, but not necessarily prolong
life.
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